

A

REVIEW

OF THE

STATE

OF THE

BRITISH NATION.

Saturday, July 12. 1707.

I Am yet on the Affair of *Spain*; the Discouragements People seem to be under at the Miscarriage there, seems to me to have too little Ground in them to justify our common Prudence—Oh, we shall be beaten out of *Spain*! Oh, we shall never recover *Spain*, and without *Spain* all this War is to no Purpose! Oh, if we do not get *Spain* out of the Hands of the *French*, our Trade is ruin'd, our Manufactures destroyed, and our Poor undone; and the latter Part of this is very true.

Well, Gentlemen, then whatever it cost, you must have *Spain*: set up your Rest by that, as *Scipio* said of *Carthage*, *Delenda est Carthago*; so I say of *Spain*, *it must recover'd*: This War must not end, let the Consequence be what it will, or the Length of it as it will, it must be a War till we recover *Spain*.

To say we shall be beaten out of *Spain*, is to say nothing; if we are, we must get into it again; to say we shall not get *Spain*, is to say nothing, for we must have it, I mean, have it out of the Hands of the *French*—There is no *Medium*, no Equivalent will serve here, and therefore to be discourag'd is Nonsense; we must have *Spain* out of *French* Hands and *French* Influence, or this War cannot be ended; we must have *Spain*, or *France* must have *Spain* and Us too.

But why must *Spain* be all lost at once? The first Consternation of a lost Battle is generally great, but King *Charles* has a great many good Towns still in his keeping, and good Garrisons in them, and if the defending these Towns can but keep off the Enemy, till a new Recruit can be sent him, if he has nothing left but *Barcelona* and *Gibraltar*, he is

is but where he was last Year, and the Work is only put back a little.

And I come to the Article of Succours; I cannot but add the only Misfortune of that *Spanish* Affair has been, that having all along been possess'd of the Readiness of the People in *Spain* to revolt, and of the powerful Assistance of the *Portuguese*; we have sent but small Numbers of Men at a Time, who being afterwards disappointed of those Expectations, have dwindled away by Sickness, hard Duty, and the Sword of the Enemy—And then the Distance of Place being added, the Impossibility of sending Supplies in Time, has sacrific'd the Handfuls left there.

And thus when *Barcelona* was taken, had it not been a Miracle of GOD's Providence, that Attempt had miscarry'd, the Force within being almost as great as the Force without—When it was reliev'd, had the Enemy not lost a great Number of their Men by the vigorous Defence of the Garrison, or had they had but 12 or 15000 Men to have supported their Army, it had been certainly taken, notwithstanding those Succours.

After it was taken, 'tis true, they had Strength enough to to relieve the City, and to take a Province or two: but when they come to have large Cities to maintain, and needful Strength to garrison, the few Troops they had were not able to do any thing, and even when join'd with the *Portuguese* Army, they could not maintain their Ground against that same Army which had fled from them with so much Disgrace at the Siege at *Barcelona*. The Reason is plain, having a great Country to keep, a great many Towns to defend, and large Garrisons to be left in *Barcelona*, *Tortosa*, *Valencia*, *Alicant*, *Doria*, *Gironne*, *Lerida*, and abundance of other small Places; these so diminished their Troops for the Field, and these things added to the Sickness of the Soldiers, occasion'd by their usual ill Government of themselves; had not the Army under the Earl of *Rivers* been sent to them, 'tis apparent, how weak they had been.

I know, there are Complaints of the Absence of the Forces with King *Charles* in *Barcelona*; but when I remember, that he found that Province just going to be inva-

ded from the side of *Barcelona*, methinks it could not be well expect'd, that both for the Guard of his Person and Defence of that whole Province, he should have less than 14 Battalions and 28 Squadrons: I therefore make this Inference, that it was not the Mistake of keeping away the Troops from the Army, as tho' the Troops in the General were too few for the Work likely to be cut out from the Garrison.

And I cannot but add, that tho' this Battle had not been fought, I do not see how it had been possible, for the Confederates in *pain* to have maintain'd themselves there this Summer, without very large Supplies: the *French* and *Spaniards* having prepar'd five Armies to act upon them, and which must to have surrounded them, that they would have infensibly been torn to pieces, a few and a few at a Time, as in several Instances they had been already the last Campaign.

The Duke of *Orleans*, he was preparing to invade *Arragon*, the Duke de *Noailles* was to enter *Catalonia* by way of *Roussillon*; two small Armies on the Frontiers of *Portugal*, and the Duke of *Berwick* at the Head of 30000 Men in the Field to face their main Body; how the handful of Men we had there could keep the Field, and at the same time keep all those Garrisons, seems to be very hard to be resolv'd; and I see no Remedy they had, but either to abandon their Conquests, to draw the Forces into the Field, or keeping their Garrisons be cut off one by one without Relief.

I have therefore, upon the whole, more Hopes of this War, now I hear, that the Allies have resolv'd to send 20000 Men thither, tho' this Battle has been fought, than I had before, when our Troops were not broken; this Loss, tho' it be a fatal one in its kind, is yet useful in this, that it may awaken the Confederates to let them know, that this War is not to be carry'd on with small Detachments, but with large Armies.

What the Emperor can say for himself, who can so easily send King *Charles* 8 or 10000 Foot by Sea from *Piedmont*, the Confederate Fleet being Masters of the Sea on that side; why he should not immediately do it, rather than busie himself in the Reduction of *Naples*, a thing that must fall of course

to the Conqueror: What Use, he can say to excuse that Piece of unaccountable Blindness, I cannot imagine.

Or which, I am of the Opinion, is one of the best Steps could be taken, if the Emperor would send a way immediately 2000 Imperial Horse — The Men, I mean, and Horses would be furnish'd with Ease in Spain, and the Horses they had, be soon recruited with Troopers in Italy. Thus, with but three Imperial Regiments of Foot sent just at this Time to revive the Spirits of the brave Remnant, that are yet left, till a complete Army of 18 or 20000 Men being ship'd from Britain and Holland could arrive; they would soon put my Lord Galway in the Field again, and I should periwade my self, they would soon retrieve the Honour lost at Almaraz, and prevent the so much dreaded Loss of Spain.

If the Emperor cannot do this, then I must think the Battle of Turin very ill improv'd, and that the French are not so weak on that side, as has been represented; That the quitting Lombardy by the French has had the Effect I expected, viz. To strengthen the French Army in the Field, and take up the Imperial Army with numerous Garrisons, which if it does, so as to disable them from pushing on the grand Affair against France, the main End of all the Expence on that side is lost, and our assisting the Duke of Savoy and Prince Eugene there with Money in large Sums, with Hessians, Prussian, and Palatinate Troops, is all to no Purpose; for the Confederates pushing Matters there at that Expence, does not terminate, nor did not merely mean to give the Emperor Milan and Mantua, and help him to crush the Princes of Italy: But to weaken French Power, to break the Hold France had there, and delivering the Duke of Savoy, put him in a Posture in Conjunction with the Emperor, to push the French and make a powerful Diversion: if then the taking of all those strong Towns from the French, obliges now the Imperialists to employ their Armies in garrisoning and keeping the Possession of them, and weakens them in the Field, I say, then the End of the War is so far defeated, and the French so far got a Victory in quitting those Towns, which took up so many of their Regiments to maintain.

And the Consequence of this is very visible, it a List of the French Army in Savoy, printed in the *Daily Courant* of June 6th, be just, in which the French Army on that side appears after all their Detachments to the Rhine and Roussillon, and some Horse to Flanders, appears to be 82 Battalions of Foot, and 39 Squadrons; and why is this, because they have now no Towns to defend; Suza and Pignerol are the only Places they have Garrisons, and their keeping so small a Force as 39 Squadrons to such an Infantry, implies plainly, they design to act defensively in the Passes of the Mountains, where the Horse cannot be so useful as in the Field.

In all these Matters, I confess, the French take their Measures so justly, that their Prudence is to be admired equally with their Diligence, and both together serve to tell us, by what Methods they have so wonderfully recover'd their Troops after such terrible Losses, as they suffer'd the last Year; Losses that no Government, no Empire in the World but that, could sustain, and have remain'd a Government; Losses that would have reduc'd the Roman Empire in its greatest Glory.

And what if I should say there is a Piece of Justice due here to King Charles, who has a Right to demand Help from Italy, for Milan is his own proper Dominion as King of Spain, and tho' it be recover'd from France by the Emperor, it is recover'd in the Name of the King of Spain — The Troops of Milan separately are, at least as France had modell'd them, at least 12000 Men, which are paid and maintain'd by the State of Milan. Now Milan being secured by Piedmont as a Barrier on one hand, the Grisons and Swiss on the other, I cannot think, why they should deny him 6 or 8000 Men of his own Subjects, and not weaken their Army to any Degree dangerous to the Confederates.

I could be large here on the Easiness of transporting these Troops from Final, or from Nice to Barcelona, our Fleet being ready in the Straights to convoy them, they would sail it at this Time of the Year in four Days, or in a Week with much Ease.

As to the Enterprize of Naples, which we are told is in hand, and which takes up